I. INTRODUCTION

C
arbon taxes have entered the national debate in recent years because of three separate public policy concerns: climate change, the growing federal debt, and the need for tax reform. The carbon tax addresses the first concern by providing businesses with an incentive to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while the other two concerns are related to potential uses of the revenues from the carbon tax. This paper addresses the latter two concerns and the trade-offs associated with alternative means of recycling carbon tax revenues. It differs from other analyses by looking at a carbon tax as a purely revenue raising measure, not as an optimal Pigouvian tax or as an instrument to achieve a predetermined reduction in emissions. Thus we compare the costs of various scenarios that combine a carbon tax with different uses of the revenue to a reference case in which there is no carbon tax. Two questions are of interest: (1) would a carbon tax be part of an optimal tax policy if there were no damages from greenhouse gases to avoid, and (2) if not, which of the recycling options is most effective in offsetting the economic costs associated with a carbon tax?
The first question is addressed by determining whether replacing some other tax (or debt financing) with a carbon tax yields welfare gains (ignoring the effects of reducing greenhouse gas emissions), and the second is addressed by comparing welfare effects across different forms of revenue recycling. The options we consider are reductions in marginal rates under the personal or corporate income taxes and reductions in budget deficits. Although there is a substantial literature on the deadweight losses of personal and corporate income taxes and the interaction between carbon taxes and income taxes (Bovenberg and de Mooij, 1994; Parry, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996) , there is little agreement among economists about how to quantify the effects of the national debt on the economy. There is considerable concern among economists and politicians about the sustainability and economic consequences of relatively high debt levels (Gale and Orzag, 2003) , but it is far less clear by what mechanism growing debt causes harm to the economy -especially in terms of the Hicksian equivalent variation over a finite horizon. What is perhaps the most commonly cited effect of the national debt -and the one analyzed in this paper -is its effect on the rate at which the government can borrow, with lower debt levels leading to lower interest rates.
The mechanisms by which reducing personal and corporate income tax rates can improve the economy are clearer. Reducing these tax burdens would put more money in the pockets of consumers and businesses and increase their incentives to work and invest, all of which would have positive economic consequences. We contrast these effects with the benefits of recycling revenues via "lump sum" transfers, which would not change incentives to work and invest.
To analyze the cumulative effects on the U.S. economy of a carbon tax, we use the N ew ERA model, which is a fully integrated energy and economic model of the U.S. economy. The N ew ERA model allows us to estimate detailed effects on energy markets as well as impacts on different sectors and different regions of the country.
The results of our analysis are broadly consistent with previous studies of the effects of carbon taxes. A carbon tax is effective at reducing emissions, but the negative economic consequences of higher energy prices outweigh the benefits of the recycling of carbon tax revenues in the revenue-recycling scenarios we model.
We find that reducing income tax rates is the most efficient use of carbon tax revenues, and lowering corporate income tax rates is preferable to lowering personal income tax rates. Our analysis shows that reducing the deficit is a relatively less efficient use of carbon tax revenues, although they can be successful at reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, which may have benefits in addition to those accounted for in our analysis. Finally, lump sum payments are the least efficient use of carbon tax revenues by a significant margin.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of the N ew ERA model, and how the carbon taxes and revenue uses are represented in the model. Section III discusses the data used to conduct the analysis. Section IV describes the scenarios examined in the paper. Section V discusses the modeling results of these scenarios, and Section VI concludes with a summary of the major implications and limitations of the analysis.
II. MODEL
A. N ew ERA Model Structure and Scope
To conduct this study, we used NERA's N ew ERA integrated model, which consists of a top-down, fully dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy, and a detailed bottom-up model of the North American electricity sector.
As a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, the N ew ERA modeling framework takes into account interactions between all parts of the economy and policy consequences that ripple throughout the economy as agents respond to policies. The detailed representation of the energy sector in the N ew ERA model along with the embedded pre-existing taxes makes the model well-suited to analyzing carbon taxes and recycling options.
B. U.S. General Equilibrium Model (Macro Model)
The model is a forward-looking dynamic CGE model of the United States. It simulates all economic interactions in the U.S. economy, including those among industries, households, and the government. The model includes a representative household, which characterizes the behavior of an average consumer, and five energy and seven industrial sectors, which represent the production sectors of the economy. In the model, the government collects initial labor and capital tax revenues and returns them back to the consumers on a lump-sum basis.
Equilibrium conditions require that goods and services markets are balanced, a zero profit condition for production (characterized by constant returns to scale in all factors) is maintained, incomes balance for households, and the labor market attains equilibrium at the natural rate of unemployment.
The N ew ERA model is based on a unique set of databases constructed by combining economic data from the IMPLAN 2008 (MIG Inc., 2010) database and energy data from the U. S. Energy Information Administration (EIA's) Annual Energy Outlook for 2011 (EIA, 2012) . The IMPLAN 2008 database provides social accounting matrices for all states for the year 2008. These matrices have inter-industry goods and services transaction data; we merge the economic data with energy supply, demand, and prices for 2008 from EIA.
The model accounts for personal income taxes on capital and labor, payroll taxes collected for Social Security under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and for Medicare hospital insurance (HI), and the corporate income tax. We take tax rates from NBER's TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) and other secondary sources. Based on TAXSIM data, we apply personal income tax rates to reflect the average marginal rate on labor income and the capital gains rate on capital income. A combined state and federal corporate income tax rate of 39.2 percent is applied to the corporate profit component of the total capital income. In addition, we apply a payroll tax rate of 12.4 percent to reflect Social Security's Old-age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program and an additional 2.9 percent to reflect Medicare's Hospital Insurance (HI) program. We differentiate tax rates by region and hold the benchmark tax rates constant over the model horizon. By merging economic data from IMPLAN, energy data from EIA, and tax rates from NBER, we build a balanced energy-economy dataset.
Baseline macroeconomic data (such as GDP), energy supply, energy demand, and energy price forecasts come from EIA (2012). Labor productivity, labor growth, and population forecasts from the U.S. Census Bureau (2005) are used to forecast baseline labor endowments and ultimately employment by industry.
All sectors except electricity are represented by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. This functional form has well-known deficiencies in representing substitution between fuel types and capital given the evolving technology for electricity generation and the way generation is dispatched to match demand that varies over the course of the day and year. We compensate for this deficiency by modeling the electric sector in detail (as described in the next section), enabling us to model environmental regulations that impact the electric sector (and ultimately the manufacturing sector) through higher electricity prices.
C. North American Electricity Model (Ele Model)
The bottom-up electricity sector model simulates the electricity markets in the United States and parts of Canada. The model includes more than 17,000 electric generating units, and capacity planning and dispatch decisions are represented simultaneously. The model dispatches electricity to load duration curves.
1 The time horizon for this study is from 2010 to 2050 in five-year increments. The model determines investments to undertake and unit dispatch by solving a dynamic, non-linear program with an objective function that minimizes the present value of total incremental system costs, while complying with all constraints, such as demand, peak demand, emissions limits, transmission limits, and other environmental and electric specific policy mandates.
We solve the bottom-up and the top-down models iteratively using a block decomposition method based on Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) using the mathematical programming system for general equilibrium (MPSGE) modeling framework (Rutherford, 1999) .
2 The top-down macroeconomic model solves for equilibrium prices, while the bottom-up model solves for equilibrium quantities. The solution process is iterated until prices and quantities converge. The integrated approach compensates for the weaknesses of each of the models and at the same time provides a consistent equilibrium framework.
The N ew ERA model has been enhanced for this study to allow the national debt to change over the model horizon (as opposed to a fixed target debt at the end of the model horizon, which had previously been the assumption embedded in the model), as well as a cost associated with increasing levels of debt.
Following Gale and Orzag (2003) , we assume that the use of tax revenues to reduce the federal debt will lead to lower interest rates for government borrowing, and therefore, lower debt service payments. We further assume that federal debt is financed by borrowing from foreign entities. Thus, reduced interest payments on government debt represent a windfall of increased wealth to U.S. consumers that would otherwise be sent outside of the U.S. economy.
The effects of this assumption in N ew ERA can be seen in the government budget constraint in the model, which equates government revenues with its expenditures We assume that a change in government debt equal to 1 percent of GDP would result in a change in the long-term interest rate of three basis points, and use this assumption to estimate the implied government interest savings associated with a reduction in debt. This assumption is largely based on Engen and Hubbard (2005) , a recent study with conclusions grounded in economic theory, backed by empirical results, and consistent with historical experience. The result that debt has a small positive effect on long-term interest rates seems more plausible than assumptions of either no effect of government debt (which many economists would say is inconsistent with theory) or a large effect (which is arguably inconsistent with historical experience). However, the magnitude of the effect of changing the debt-to-GDP ratio on interest rates is subject to considerable debate. We do not model the reduced interest rates on private borrowing that would be expected under the "conventional view" of deficit reductions described above, and there are other potential economic effects of reducing the deficit that may be no less important. For example, lower debt may lead to lower risk premiums on government bonds, reduced inflation, reduced policy uncertainty, and/or reduced expectations of future taxes. In addition, according to Keynesian economics, reducing deficits during an economic downturn could exacerbate a recession.
III. SCENARIO DESIGN
We construct six different scenarios combining two different carbon tax rates and six different recycling options, assuming that debt grows according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2012) Extended Alternative Fiscal Scenario until the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches 100 percent. We assume carbon tax rates of $15 per ton of CO2 and $25 per ton of CO2 starting in 2013 and rising at 4 percent annually in 2012 dollars. While a $15 carbon tax is used as a plausible political outcome, we also simulate a more stringent carbon tax policy of $25 per ton of CO2. This paper assumes, as was true at the time of writing, that there would be a substantial automatic reduction in spending on January 1, 2012 and simultaneous elimination of a number of tax reductions. This was the CBO Baseline. We use CBO's Alternative forecast, which assumed that the sequestration of funds would be prevented and tax increases avoided. CBO's Alternative forecast turned out to be much closer to reality than the CBO Baseline.
The amount by which tax rates or the debt can be reduced is determined endogenously, as the budget deficit is assumed to remain unchanged when we swap taxes or pay down the debt. A portion of carbon tax revenues must be reserved to cover the loss in tax revenues associated with the increases in the prices of carbon-intensive products, and only the remainder (i.e., the increase in carbon tax revenues less the reduction in other tax revenues) is available for a tax swap. The calculation of the proper rate reduction is endogenous in the model. Of course, in reality, tax revenues are not estimated dynamically in budget processes, so even "pay as you go" rules do not guarantee exact fiscal neutrality. Similarly, funds available for debt reduction must be calculated after the dynamic effect of the carbon tax is taken into account. Debt reduction also changes the expenditure side of the budget when the effect on the rate of government borrowing is included. Therefore, debt reduction must also be calculated endogenously. The carbon tax provides a broad incentive for emission reductions throughout the economy, and the larger carbon tax produces larger emission reductions. Figure 3 shows that in the baseline, carbon dioxide emissions rise from 5,450 billion metric tons of CO 2 to 5,908 billion metric tons of CO 2 , a modest average annual growth of 0.2 percent. Under the $15 carbon tax, emissions drop to 15 percent below 2005 levels by 2053 4 and the reduction in cumulative emissions is about 6.4 gigatons of CO 2 over the model horizon, while in the $25 case, emissions drop to 39 percent below 2005 levels. In the second panel of Figure 3 , welfare measured as the Hicksian equivalent variation (EV) over the model horizon is down from the baseline by 0.6 percent and 0.9 percent for the $15 and $25 carbon tax cases (with offsetting welfare benefits of increased leisure included).
IV. RESULTS
A. Lump Sum Revenue Recycling
B. Income Tax Swap
Next, we adjust marginal tax rates for either personal or corporate income taxes so that (taking account of the dynamic effects of carbon taxes on other tax revenues) the assumed federal deficit target is met. The resulting changes are shown in Figure 4 .
The reduction in the personal income tax rate is about 1.4 percent to 1.7 percent on average for the deficit and tax swap scenarios, while for the full tax swap scenario the personal income tax rate decreases by about 4 percent to 5 percent on average. Corporate income tax rate reductions are much larger -14 percent to 18 percent on average for the partial tax swap and 44 percent to 55 percent for the full tax swap -because corporate tax revenues are much smaller relative to personal income tax revenues. We would expect the corporate income tax swap to provide a larger efficiency gain compared to the personal income tax swap because the corporate income tax rate reductions are larger and because the corporate income tax is far more distortionary than the personal income tax. This is exactly what we see in Figure 5 . Using the carbon tax revenue to reduce the corporate tax rate has the lowest welfare loss of all the recycling scenarios. Since there is a negative welfare effect for all of the revenue-recycling cases we have modeled, a carbon tax -despite being a consumption tax -is not sufficiently broad based to be an efficient revenue collection instrument without the Pigouvian rationale.
In the next two figures we review the dynamic allocation of the carbon tax revenues, in those cases in which the carbon tax leads to reductions in other tax revenues. When 50 percent of the available revenue is used for a personal income tax swap, a higher carbon tax does not necessarily imply more revenue for deficit reduction or tax swap. With the $15 carbon price, 71 percent of the carbon revenue is available for recycling activities, but with the $25 carbon price, only 54 percent of the carbon revenue is available for recycling activities. At the higher carbon tax rate, the tax base for income taxes is eroded more than proportionately, and hence less tax revenue is collected from income taxes. Thus, more carbon revenue has to be used to hold total revenue constant.
In the case in which 50 percent of the available revenue is used for a corporate income tax swap, there is more revenue available for recycling. At the $15 carbon price, 75 percent of the carbon revenue is available for recycling, and at $25 per ton, 58 percent of the carbon revenue is available for recycling activities. Since, as we saw above, the corporate income tax is more distorting, there is more rapid revenue gain from recycling through the corporate income tax and less total carbon tax revenue is set aside to hold total revenue constant. This example shows that the dynamic, endogenous calculation of tax swaps must take into account not only the distorting effect of the new tax being collected, but also the effects associated with the other tax revenue reductions.
C. Reduction in the Federal Debt
Finally, we review the modeling results when the carbon tax revenues are used to lower the federal debt. Figure 7 shows the path of the debt-to-GDP ratio under the different recycling options. The deficit reduction scenario provides the largest decrease, 12 percent, in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the long run. In comparison, a personal income tax swap results in about a 4 percent reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio by 2053. Neither of the carbon tax revenue options brings the debt-to-GDP ratio
Figure 7
Improvement in Debt-to-GDP down to a sustainable level due to the erosion in the tax base caused by the carbon tax.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have estimated the economic impacts of carbon taxes with six different methods of recycling the tax revenue. In each case, we found that carbon taxes reduce greenhouse gas emissions but at a cost to the economy. Deficit reduction and tax swap strategies (a reduction of personal income tax or corporate income tax rates) help mitigate the economic costs of a carbon tax, and the corporate income tax swap was found to be more efficient than other tax swaps. The deficit reduction strategy provides the largest reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, but does not stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.
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